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In recent years, politicians’ use of performance and other accounting information has attracted a lot of 
attention of researchers engaged in the study of public sector accounting and public sector management. 
New Public Management (NPM) attaches great value to these types of information, which are particu-
larly aimed at helping elected politicians – who are considered as the principals in government organi-
sations – to control their ‘agents’. Based on research findings, some researchers have suggested to both 
increase politicians’ knowledge of accounting and to improve the accounting information made availa-
ble. However, the effect this had on the use of the available information by politicians is unclear. The 
various changes introduced in the local governments in the Netherlands over the past thirty years or so, 
have improved the financial management and may also have helped to create a more performance-ori-
ented and ‘business-like’ culture in the Dutch public sector. However, the empirical research presented 
in this paper suggests that neither performance nor other accounting information in formal, written or 
digital documents plays a very prominent role in the politicians’ control tasks. The use of these types of 
information by politicians in controlling their agents still seems to be limited. Further, politicians indi-
cate that they attach a lot of value to more qualitative and probably subjective types of information. Such 
types of information are in their eyes very important to fulfil the role of representative of the citizens 





With the rise of New Public Management (NPM), the importance of accounting information in 
the public sector has increased. And although NPM has been criticised and further develop-
ments took place, it still seems to play a very important role in public sector management (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 208, 211; Lodge and Hood, 2012; ter Bogt, 2018). In an NPM setting, 
accounting information should not just provide insight into finances, i.e. inputs, and processes, 
but also into performances, i.e. outputs and outcomes (Hood, 1991, 1995). 
 In recent years, several researchers of public sector management have paid attention to 
politicians’ use of the available accounting information, and more particularly to the perfor-
mance information (see, e.g., ter Bogt, 2001, 2004; Melkers and Willoughby, 2005; Pollitt, 
2006; Askim, 2007, 2009; Van Dooren, 2008; Demaj and Summermatter, 2012; Saliterer and 
Korac, 2013; Kroll, 2014; ter Bogt et al., 2015; Buylen and Christiaens, 2016; Grossi et al., 
2016; van Helden, 2016; Giacomini et al., 2016). The precise focus of this research differs and 
its findings are somewhat mixed. However, the overall impression is that the politicians in-
volved may consider the performance information in accounting documents as potentially im-
portant, but that their use of this information is quite limited (see also Demaj and Summermat-
ter, 2012). The various papers mention different reasons for this; for instance, a lack of account-
ing knowledge, a preference for other sources of information, insufficient time to study the 
                                                            
1 Henk J. ter Bogt, University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Accounting, 
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information on a regular basis, the politicians’ focus on ‘incidents’, or the poor quality of the 
available information (see, e.g., ter Bogt, 2001, 2004; Askim, 2008; ter Bogt, et al., 2015; Hynd-
man, 2016; Moynihan, 2016; van Helden, 2016; Pommer and Boelhouwer, 2017).  
 Given the role assigned to the municipal council in the Netherlands, a councillor’s low 
use of the performance information in accounting documents, such as the annual budget and 
the annual account, can be considered as an undesirable situation. After all, this low use does 
not fit the position of the council – whose members are elected politicians – as the highest 
hierarchical level in the Dutch municipalities. Operating at the highest level in the hierarchy 
means that the councillors, in terms of the principal-agent theory, are considered as the princi-
pals at the municipal level. Principals are supposed to control their agents – in this context the 
members of the Executive and the municipal organisation – who perform certain tasks on behalf 
of them. Steering and controlling the Executive (and the municipal organisation) on main lines 
is then one of the major tasks assigned to the councillors by the Dutch central government. And 
the latter expects the council to at least make use of the annual budget and the annual account 
in this context (Staatsblad, 2003; Staatscourant, 2016; Commisie BBV, 2018). These account-
ing documents are supposed to include financial information as well as related performance 
information on outputs and outcomes.  
 So, just like NPM, Dutch central government suggests that accounting and performance 
information should help principals (i.e., councillors) in controlling and monitoring their ‘sub-
ordinates’, and that they contribute to the latter’s accountability (Hood, 1991, 1995). This in-
formation is meant to help the councillors in the decision-making process and in the control of 
the execution of the tasks by the Executive, i.e. to steer and monitor the Executive and the 
municipal organisation (which supports the Executives in preparing and fulfilling their tasks). 
All in all, the purpose of the information is to help take the best decisions from an economical 
perspective, an idea that fits NPM’s basic assumption of a rational use of information and, more 
generally, the concept of economic rationalism (see also Flinders, 2011, p.611). However, as 
indicated, over the years various researchers have observed problems with respect to the quality, 
usefulness and use of public sector performance and other accounting information. Further-
more, some authors indicate that information is easily used as ammunition for political ‘at-
tacks’, as opposed to the more ‘rational’ and balanced use as presumed by NPM and Dutch 
central government (see, e.g., Burchell et al., 1980; Flinders, 2011, pp. 602-603; van Helden, 
2016; Giacomini et al., 2016).  
Councillors are not the sole users of the performance and other accounting information. 
Civil servants, for example, can also make use of such information. Further, having the ac-
counting reports drawn up by the civil servants as such can be a meaningful process, also be-
cause it can help, for example, to build trust in the organisation and to ‘discipline’ people in-
volved (see, e.g. Liang, 2000; Arya et al., 2004). However, since the councillors are formally 
the principals and thus responsible for steering and controlling the organisation on main lines, 
they can be regarded as an important group of users, which receives the information via the 
budget and annual account and other planning & control documents. Some authors suggest that 
politicians mainly use the performance and other accounting information when having to make 
‘special’ decisions or in case of ‘incidents’ (see, e.g., van Helden, 2016; Moynihan, 2016). 
However, it seems that so far only limited empirical research has been conducted into the rea-
sons why politicians, i.e. councillors, sometimes make little and at other times a more intensive 
use of the available performance and other accounting information. The same is true with re-
spect to the politicians’ information needs and how the information could be improved to better 
meet the users’ requirements  (cf. van Helden et al., 2016). This puts the focus on the role, 
experiences and perceptions of the providers of the municipal accounting information, in par-
ticular the civil servants (cf. Taylor, 2009). What could they do to better meet the councillors’ 
information needs? This paper emphasises the previous issues with respect to the accounting 
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information provided to councillors, and the extent to which there is a need to improve its quan-
tity and/or quality. This is all the more relevant, since the findings suggest that councillors in 
the Netherlands might show an increased interest in more qualitative and informal types of 
information, i.e. non-accounting types of information (cf. Pommer and Boelhouwer, 2017, 
p.31).  
The findings presented in this paper are based on field studies conducted in ten munici-
palities in the Netherlands in the years 2016-2017. The paper is structured as follows. The next 
section briefly sketches the position and role of councillors in several municipalities in the 
Netherlands. It also depicts the role of the civil servants in giving support to the councillors and 
providing them with accounting information in the planning & control documents. Next, an 
overview follows of the literature in the field of accounting information in the public sector and 
its use by politicians. This section also provides the research questions. Subsequently, the meth-
odology and field research are dealt with. After that, the paper presents the empirical findings. 
Finally, a discussion of the findings follows and the conclusions are presented. 
 
2. The position of the council and the role of accounting documents  
 
The members of the municipal councils in the Netherlands, i.e. the councillors, are elected every 
four years by the citizens of the municipality where they are active. The municipal council is 
the highest hierarchical level in a municipality, so formally its members are the principals of 
the municipal organisation. However, most councillors are in fact part-time politicians (council 
membership is a part-time activity), who have their main job elsewhere. Council and committee 
meetings generally take place in late afternoons and evenings.  
 Councillors represent a political party, either a party that also operates on a national 
level or (and this is increasingly the case) one that operates only on the local level. The number 
of councillors is related to the size of the municipality and can vary between 9 (in very small 
municipalities, although very rare nowadays) and 45 (for municipalities with over 200,000 in-
habitants). Of the total number of 355 municipalities in the Netherlands (situation 1 January 
2019), about 240 have a population size between 20,000 – 100,000, which implies that they 
have between 19 and 37 council members (cf. ROB, 2018, p. 46). 
 The main tasks of the council are to steer and control the municipality by deciding on 
the main lines of the municipal policy and to monitor the Executive on the execution of the 
policy and related tasks. Furthermore, the councillors are explicitly expected to fulfil the role 
of representative of the citizens, i.e. they are supposed to voice the citizens’ interests. Depend-
ing on the size of the municipality, the work of a councillor takes on average about 16 hours 
per week (for reading policy documents and attending meetings, meet with citizens and organ-
isations, etc). A survey conducted in 2014 showed that in the smallest municipality category 
distinguished in the survey (municipalities up to 14,000 inhabitants), councillors spent on av-
erage 12 hours per week on their council work. In the category of the largest municipalities 
(over 150,000 inhabitants) this number was on average almost 25 hours (Daadkracht, 2014, 
pp.8, 15-16).  
 The council is supported by the ‘clerk of the council’, a civil servant appointed by the 
council who operates at a certain distance from other civil servants in the municipal organisa-
tion. In most municipalities, the council clerk is supported by a relatively small council office 
staff. Mostly, the council office counts between 2 and 7 full-time equivalents (fte) in total (see 
e.g. Van Hulst et al., 2016, p. 23). The clerk and his/her office summarise policy notes, provide 
secretarial services to the council, support councillors with information or help them formulate 
policy initiatives. They also have the role of intermediary between the council and the municipal 
organisation, i.e. the Executive and the civil servants (Schaap et al., 2018).  
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 The councillors elect the members of the Executive (i.e., aldermen), who are generally 
full-time politicians. The Executives, who in the so-called dual system2 are not members of the 
council anymore, can be former councillors, but they can also come from outside the council. 
The Executive is responsible for the preparation and execution of the daily tasks. In practice, 
the Executives often also initiate policy initiatives and prepare the annual budget as well as 
other accounting documents. In performing these activities, the Executives are supported by the 
municipal organisation, i.e. the civil servants who are specialists in the various policy areas. 
However, external parties to which tasks have been outsourced can also be involved. 
 The accounting information made available to the councillors forms part of the munici-
pality’s planning & control cycle. The government’s Accounts Act requires all Dutch munici-
palities to present a budget and an annual account each calendar year (as well as a financial 
estimate for a period of four years ahead). On certain occasions, more specific documents are 
drawn up (for example, a report to decide on a new policy or project or that discusses a major 
problem). Although the annual budget is formally drawn up by the council, in practice it is 
prepared by the civil servants in close cooperation with the Executive. Sometimes the council 
is consulted before the formulation of the draft version of the budget. The civil servants also 
prepare other accounting documents, such as the ‘Note on Financial and Policy Perspectives’, 
sometimes called the ‘Spring Memorandum’. This Perspectives note is a document usually pub-
lished in May, which discusses the financial framework for the next budget year and the possi-
ble policy initiatives to be taken, including the preferences with respect to policy changes. Fur-
thermore, one or several intermediate reports may be part of the municipal planning & control 
cycle. In general, these intermediate reports have a strictly financial focus. The annual account 
has to be audited by an external auditor. 
 Since the council is the highest hierarchical level in the municipality (and formally 
draws up the budget), it has to approve the budget and annual account as well as the financial 
and performance information included in these documents. The council also has to approve the 
policy notes for new policy initiatives (including the related finance and performance infor-
mation) drawn up by the Executive and the civil servants during the year. 
 Each municipality is to a considerable extent autonomous in deciding about the contents 
of its accounting documents. This implies that the components of the planning & control cycle 
and the contents of the accounting documents differ among municipalities. Apart from adjust-
ments which can be mandated by central government, the ideas for changes in the accounting 
documents are often initiated or further developed by the municipal civil servants (in several 
cases with the help of external consultants). However, after the introduction of the dual system, 
the Dutch municipalities have since 2004 been legally required to draw up output and outcome 
budgets as well as annual accounts for their policy programmes (Tweede Kamer, 2000-2001; 
Staatsblad, 2003). These documents formally have to contain both financial and performance 
information (i.e., information on the performances in the various policy fields).3 The govern-
ment documents about the dual system and the ouput and outcome budget clearly breathe the 
                                                            
2 The dual system was introduced in 2002. In this system the responsibilities and powers of the municipal council , which 
is formally the highest authority in the municipal organisation – are in principle clearly separated from those of the 
Executive committee. The council should decide – i.e., steer and control – on the main lines of policy and the Executive 
is responsible for the policy execution. The former monistic system, used until 2002, emphasized a joint responsibility 
of the Council and the Executive for policy making and policy execution. In the monistic system the aldermen, i.e. 
members of the Executive, were also a member of the council. This is not the case anymore in the dual system, so that 
the responsibilities of the council and the Executive are in principle more clearly separated. The mayor is the ‘non-
political’ chairperson of the Executive, who is formally appointed by the King (so not by the council).  
3 Since 2016, municipalities have no longer been obligated to issue a product budget (it has been replaced by an 
overview of ‘task fields’), but the outcome budget still has to contain performance information, i.e. information 
on activities and outputs and in particular on the municipal policies’ outcomes (Staatscourant, 2015, 2016; Com-
missie BBV, 2018).  
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NPM principles of rational management and the agent (i.e., Executive and civil servants) being 
steered and controlled on main lines by the principal (the municipal council). 
 Each municipality can decide autonomously how many policy programmes it wants to 
initiate and how they are defined, and to a large extent it can also determine which performance 
information it wants to present. However, since 2016 all municipalities have to include a small 
standard set of financial indicators in their programme budgets and annual accounts (Staatsblad, 
2003, 2015). Since 2017, also an additional set of 39 more general indicators has to be included, 
such as school absenteeism percentages, the number of jobs per 1,000 citizens and the number 
of violent crimes per 1,000 citizens (Staatsblad, 2016; Staatscourant, 2016). The idea behind 
this obligation is that these indicators could help councillors and citizens in comparing their 
municipality with other municipalities.  
 Once the budget and policy notes have been accepted by the council and the main policy 
lines have been determined, the Executive (supported by the civil servants) is politically re-
sponsible for realising the plans and the more detailed execution of the tasks. The Executive 
also has to give account to the council of the finances spent and the performances realised. In 
their turn, the members of the council in principle are supposed to explain and give account to 
the citizens of the performance of the municipality.  
 
3. Local politicians and accounting documents: literature review 
 
Traditionally the management and control of local government organisations in the Netherlands 
mainly focussed on inputs and processes. However, like in many other countries, there have 
been several changes in this respect since the mid 1980s. In connection with an increasing in-
terest in aspects of NPM in both the Netherlands and elsewhere, a larger emphasis has been put 
on a more ‘businesslike and professionalised’ management approach, meant to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector (and, from a more ideological point of view, to 
reduce the size of government). Around 1985 or so, Dutch municipalities gradually started to 
introduce ‘contract management’ and output budgets, as well as annual accounts/reports which 
include output information. In this context, the so-called PMI project – which was an NPM-like 
project – played an important role in local government (van Helden, 1998). In the second half 
of the 1990s, this was followed by the introduction of outcome (or ‘programme’) budgets and 
annual accounts. In principle, these types of performance budgets contained information on 
outputs and/or on outcomes. They could be used for accountability, decision-making and con-
trol purposes (Jackson, 2011, p. 16).  
 The term performance can refer to different things (Wholey, 1999, pp.289-290; Jackson, 
2011, p.15). Pollitt (2006, p. 39) indicates a preference for performance budgets that focus ex-
clusively on outputs and outcomes. However, the performance budgets of the Dutch munici-
palities actually not only contain information on outputs and outcomes, but also – and some-
times mainly – on throughputs, i.e. activities and processes (see, e.g., ter Bogt et al., 2015). 
Accrual accounting was already introduced in municipalities in the Netherlands in 1985.  
 The introduction by the Dutch municipalities of output and outcome budgets implied 
that the political and managerial decision-making and control activities in principle had to be 
output- and outcome-oriented. However, as has been observed in the literature, in the public 
sector the outputs and outcomes can relatively often be characterised by a low degree of meas-
urability (Budding, 2015, p.90). The literature has also discussed several other factors that can 
complicate public sector performance measurement, for example, the multiplicity and ambigu-
ity of goals, the incompleteness of the performance measurement (e.g. when partners are in-
volved) and the importance of other aspects than economic efficiency, i.e. the social and polit-
ical dimensions of public management (see, e.g., Carter, 1991; ter Bogt, 2001; Hood, 2007; 
Jackson, 2011). Despite the consequences that a low measurability of performance together 
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with the other complexities could have for the type of control to be applied (see, e.g., Ouchi, 
1979; Hofstede, 1981; Carter, 1981), the NPM approach, with its focus on output and outcome 
control, was adopted. The performance budgets that municipalities in the Netherlands have to 
draw up on the basis of the central government’s budget rules are supposed to facilitate the 
routine output (and outcome) controls (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksre-
laties, 2003; cf. Hofstede, 1981, pp.196-200). So the implicit premise seems to be, in fact, that 
the municipalities’ activities and outputs (and outcomes) are standardised and measurable (ter 
Bogt et al., 2015), which would create the ‘ideal’ NPM setting. In such a situation, output con-
trols can become routine controls and accounting information can give a clear insight into the 
municipality’s performance.  
 More in general, Hood (1995, pp.93-96) considers ‘accountingisation’ and public ac-
countability in terms of results as the major elements of NPM. Accounting information should 
help in evaluating the performance of the municipal organisation and in strictly monitoring and 
controlling the Executive and its civil servants, i.e. the agents. The idea is that accounting num-
bers are helpful to a principal in the processes of decision-making and control and in taking 
decisions which are from an economical perspective the ‘best’ choices. They are also of help in 
monitoring the agents, who the specialists with the more detailed knowledge and who can be 
trusted only to a limited extent, as argued by theories such as the principal-agent and public 
choice theory, which underlie NPM (see also Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Flinders, 2011; 
Bouckaert, 2012). In a municipality, the council officially is the highest hierarchical level, i.e. 
the principal, whilst the Executive (and its civil servants) is the agent. So, the accounting infor-
mation is supposed to help principals, i.e. the councillors, in being able to act in line with NPM’s 
basic assumption of economic rationalism. Ideally, the municipality and its councillors could 
also use this information to give account to the citizens who elected the council (Bovens, 2005). 
 Although this paper does not extensively discuss the pros and cons of performance 
measurement, one of the pros as indicated by NPM advocates is that performance measurement 
can contribute to increasing efficiency (see, e.g., Smith, 1993; Noordegraaf et al., 2014, pp.8-
10). However, apart from the efficiency objective, NPM changes in the Dutch municipalities 
have particularly been initiated to strengthen the position of the councillors. The availability of 
more elaborate performance information is considered to facilitate the councillors in controlling 
the municipal organisation more effectively. Furthermore, more extensive information on ‘re-
sults’ and efficiency has been supposed to enhance citizens’ support for the local politics, since 
it increases transparency and makes the municipal performance more visible to the public (van 
Helden, 1998). 
 The introduction of output and outcome budgets in the Dutch municipalities was in a 
more technical sense not a complete success, to put it in mild terms. In general, they mainly 
contained information on activities and processes (number of meetings, hours spent on certain 
tasks, number of visitors, number of complaints received, etc.). Although such information may 
provide certain insights (cf. Johnsen, 2005), it was not really the type of data intended to be 
included in output or outcome budgets. However, outputs, i.e. the ‘products’ realised, indeed 
often appeared to be difficult to define or measure or were measured only partially. Further-
more, the relationship between the budgets and the outputs realised in a particular budget year 
was mostly not very clear (ter Bogt, 2001, 2004; ter Bogt et al., 2015). Moreover, the perfor-
mance realised was often influenced by partner organisations and other external factors (see 
also Carter, 1981). And all these complications played an even stronger role in the measurement 
of outcomes, i.e. the effects in society realised with the budget available for a specific policy in 
a certain year. So in a technical sense there were several problems with the performance budgets 
in municipalities.  
 Previous research indicated that politicians (Executives and councillors) did appreciate 
the ‘informative’ value of the quantitative performance information available in accounting 
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documents (ter Bogt, 2001, p.632), but also suggested that for the purpose of decision-making 
and control they mostly used it only to a very limited extent (ter Bogt, 2004; ter Bogt et al., 
2015). Perhaps they particularly appreciated the information when they had only limited expe-
rience with it (ter Bogt, 2004, p. 248). Furthermore, the politicians, especially the Executives, 
indicated that in several cases they preferred ‘quick’, more informal information (which may 
even be subjective) to performance information in written accounting documents (ter Bogt, 
2004). Over the years, similar and other problems with accounting information, and in particu-
lar with performance measurement, have also been observed in several other countries, although 
in some cases the findings suggest that performance information is used quite intensively (see, 
e.g., Melkers and Willoughby, 2005; Pollitt, 2006; Askim, 2007, 2009; Van Dooren, 2005, 
2008; Flinders, 2011; Jackson, 2011; Kroll, 2014; van Helden, 2016; Hyndman, 2016; Giaco-
mini et al., 2016; Gomes et al., 2017; cf. van Helden and Reichard, 2019).  
 An Italian case researched by Giacomini et al. (2016) found that accounting information 
is used more intensively in situations of political conflict. However, in this particular case it 
was not so much used in a comprehensive and ‘rational’ manner to take the ‘best’ decision, but 
more to support a political point of view, i.e. certain elements of the information were used to 
provide ‘ammunition’ in the discussion (Burchell et al., 1980; Flinders, 2011). But whether 
accounting information is used in a ‘rational’ way or not, a survey amongst councillors in Dutch 
municipalities conducted in 2015 (with 2,200 respondents) showed that only 11% of the re-
spondents had chosen to become a councillor to control the Executive and the way in which the 
policies were executed (van Wijnen and Hulsen, 2015, p.17).4 The question is, of course, 
whether the unpopularity of these activities also influences their use of the accounting docu-
ments. 
 However, despite the problems with the measurement of performance and the quality of 
the performance information, the introduction of output and outcome budgets in the Dutch mu-
nicipalities together with various minor accounting changes over the years, may to some extent 
have been ‘fruitful’ in that it changed the institutional context and organisational culture (cf. ter 
Bogt and Scapens, 2019). This is because as a result of the terminology used the discussions 
and ways of thinking in local government started to change. The pure emphasis on inputs de-
creased, as well as the focus on rules. Gradually, civil servants and politicians started to think 
more in terms of the outputs and outcomes realised via the budgets (ter Bogt, 2008). So these 
various changes contributed to a change in mindset, in which the results realised with the aid 
of the government policy received more attention. In this context, it should also be noted that 
in some cases councillors were to some extent satisfied with the performance information that 
they received or that, at least, they were of the opinion that in principle it would be desirable to 
have ‘good’ performance information available. However, the councillors also wanted this in-
formation (its quality and/or quantity) to be further improved (ter Bogt et al., 2015). In this 
respect, Johnsen (2005, pp.14-15) indicates that the perceived benefits of the use of perfor-
mance indicators in the public sector deserve attention. In his view, the use of indicators in 
discussions to influence the balance of power, i.e. a ‘political’ use of performance information 
to obtain a political gain (cf. Burchell et al., 1980; Flinders, 2011), may also be regarded as 
appropriate and effective.  
 So despite the many criticisms , there are also indications that public sector performance 
information has – or could have – a certain value for councillors. This finding suggests that it 
may make sense to research what could be done to better serve this group with better perfor-
mance and other accounting information, or other types of information they need. This implies 
that not only the councillors themselves, but also the providers of the accounting information 
                                                            
4 ‘Making a contribution to society’ – whatever this may mean precisely –  was by far the most important reason 
indicated (84% found this important), followed by the ambition to realise one’s own political ideas, which was 
important for 43% of the respondents (van Wijnen and Hulsen, 2015, p.17). 
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in the planning & control documents, i.e. the civil servants, may have to think about how the 
councillors could be better served in this respect. 
 
The above literature review suggests that there are some obstacles to the use of performance 
and other accounting information by councillors. Furthermore, the review indicates that there 
has been only limited academic research into the information needs of local government coun-
cillors and what providers could do to better serve them in their role as principal in the munic-
ipal hierarchy. Therefore, the following broad research questions have been formulated.  
 
1. How do councillors use and value the performance and other accounting information 
currently available in the municipal planning & control documents? 
2. What accounting information do councillors need to effectively fulfil their decision-
making and controlling tasks and, more in general, their role as principal in the municipal or-
ganisation?  
3. What further changes are needed in the information provided to the councillors to better 
fit their needs?  
 
The following section discusses the research methodology used in this study. Next, the findings 
from the field research conducted in ten municipalities in the Netherlands will be presented.  
 
4. Research method 
 
The past fifteen years or so, the use of performance and other accounting information by poli-
ticians has received quite some attention. Questions that have received far less interest, how-
ever, are why politicians either do or do not use the performance and other accounting infor-
mation available to them in the planning & control documents, and what kind of information 
they actually need or prefer in their role as principal in the municipal organisation. In this con-
text, the opinions and role of the providers of accounting information, i.e. the civil servants, 
seem to have received very limited attention. Furthermore , the focus in the research conducted 
mainly seems to have been on quantitative performance data and only to a very limited extent 
on more qualitative types of performance information (or perhaps better: ‘performance-related’ 
information). For that reason it was decided to start an explorative field research project, in-
tended to shed some more light on these issues. The project began in April 2016 and continued 
until mid-2017. Five master’s students, co-ordinated and supervised by the author of this paper, 
were involved in this project. Each of them conducted research in two municipalities. 
The empirical research and the interviews were initially led by the exploration of exist-
ing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.536). However, although the literature gave guidance to the 
research and the formulation of the interview questions, we wanted to approach our research 
with an open mind to be able to obtain more in depth insights into the accountability and control 
process and the role of the performance and other accounting information available in the plan-
ning & control documents. Therefore, it was decided to conduct descriptive and exploratory 
field research with semi-structured interviews (see also Ahrens, 2004, p.298). To obtain an im-
pression of whether factors such as the size of the municipality, or possessing (cf. Daadkracht, 
2014) specific knowledge in the field of planning and control (Askim, 2009) had any impact, 
councillors with different specialisations were interviewed and municipalities of different sizes 
were included in the research. 
Some councillors (sometimes informally) had the role of financial ‘specialist’ in their 
council or party, which especially applied to the political parties with a number of representa-
tives in the council. These specialists who probably use the accounting documents relatively 
intensively, might have specific information desires or suggestions for changes. Therefore, we 
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also wanted to include them in the research. If necessary, the specialists were selected after 
consultation with the council clerk. We included municipalities of different sizes in the re-
search, because in small municipalities with only a limited number of civil servants, the number 
of specialised employees in the field of planning and control might be limited. And this could 
influence the ‘quality’ of the planning & control documents. 
The municipalities were all located in the northern half of the Netherlands. They were 
selected on the basis of their size and willingness to participate. The number of inhabitants in 
the municipalities varied between about 11,000 and 125,000. By Dutch standards, three of them 
could be classified as small (less than 35,000 inhabitants), three as medium-sized (between 
35,000 and 75,000) and four as large (over 75,000; with three municipalities having over 
100,000 inhabitants). The small municipalities involved were Littenseradiel, Staphorst and Op-
sterland, the medium-sized ones Heerenveen, Barneveld and Assen and the large ones Lelystad, 
Leeuwarden, Ede and Zwolle. 
The interviewees were councillors, council clerks (or employees of the council clerk 
office) and civil servants involved in preparing the municipal planning & control information. 
Of the 10 municipalities included in this paper, in total 21 councillors were interviewed (about 
half of whom had the role of financial specialist), as well as 11 council clerks (or council clerk 
employees) and 13 civil servants (of whom 10 were responsible for the accounting and financial 
management). In each municipality, interviews were held with at least two councillors, one civil 
servant and the council clerk (or a council clerk employee). The interviews generally took about 
one hour, sometimes a bit less and in several instances also considerably longer. The interviews 
were recorded and based on that the research assistants wrote extensive interview reports (gen-
erally containing about eight to twelve pages) which were sent for approval to the interviewees. 
The approved interview reports formed part of the basis for the findings presented in this paper. 
Furthermore, information was gathered from minutes of council and council committee meet-
ings and from various planning & control documents (annual budgets, annual accounts, interim 
reports, and other documents in the field of financial management). In a few cases, an assistant 
attended a meeting of the municipal council or watched videos of a meeting (i.e., a meeting 
where the annual budget or annual account was discussed).  
 Since in each municipality only a limited number of people were interviewed, the focus 
in the research was not on providing an in-depth analysis of each individual case. Instead, the 
idea was to include councillors with different backgrounds (i.e., different political parties, dif-
ferent policy areas) from municipalities of different sizes, and to find out possible similarities 
and differences in their opinions. However, the analysis of the information gathered suggests 
that despite some minor differences, basically, in all cases, the opinions about the use of per-
formance and other accounting information and what is required to improve this information, 
were highly homogeneous. The background of the councillors and the size of the municipality 
did not seem to have any major role in this context. Consequently, the emphasis in this paper is 
particularly on the commonalities found in the cases researched, and not on the minor differ-
ences among them. 
 To make sure that the individual interviewees’ responses as presented in our study could 
not be linked to specific people, they were anonymised as much as possible. The people quoted 
are referred to by a letter or a number. The three groups of interviewees (councillors, civil serv-
ants, council clerks) are distinguished by a number, a capital and a lowercase, respectively (so, 
for example, interviewee 1 is a councillor, interviewee A civil servant and interviewee b a coun-





5. Empirical findings 
 
This section presents some findings from the empirical research conducted in the ten munici-
palities in a summarised form. Since the responses to the interview questions were quite homo-
geneous, the focus of this paper will particularly be on the similarities found.  
 
5.1 Availability of performance information 
 
What type of performance and other accounting information is provided to the councillors? The 
councillors, civil servants and council clerks interviewed indicated that some of the information 
required on past and expected future performance in the various areas was provided by policy 
notes. These notes give a sketch of the policy goals and initiatives to be taken in a certain area 
in the next four or five years. They may also contain some information on past performance 
and/or expected future results. However, the interviewees all agreed  that the general quality of 
the information in these notes, for example about the goals and performance to be realised, was 
rather vague. As councillor 7 put it: “Often there are no policy documents available in which 
the objectives are described in a clear manner. … This being the case, it is difficult to determine 
our focus.” A financial civil servant, interviewee A, noted in this context that mostly neither 
the Executive nor the council show an interest in formulating the policy goals more clearly, 
perhaps to promote a compromise, or because this approach gives more leeway. Councillor 15 
indicated that vague objectives in policy notes had consequences for the goals included in p&c-
documents: “Our budgetary goals are usually formulated in very general terms too, for example, 
‘we want a good care provision for our inhabitants’. Yes, we all want that and I want world 
peace too.”  
 There were some differences among the municipalities with respect to the number of 
interim p&c-reports drawn up during a budget year. However, all municipalities published a 
programme budget, an annual account/report and at least one interim report. Furthermore, all 
but one small municipality drew up a Perspectives note, mostly annually (but in one municipal-
ity every two years, whilst another municipality combined the Perspectives note and the annual 
account/report into one document). The Perspectives note is, just like the programme budget, a 
document which is formally drawn up by the council.  At least, the council should decide upon 
its contents. However, in practice the role of the council is very limited, as indicated by the 
interviewees. Councillor 2, for example, whose party is in the coalition on which the Executive 
committee is based, said that he had informal meetings with ‘his’ Executive to discuss policy 
issues. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion that in practice the civil servants (and Executives) 
are the ones to draw up the Perspectives note, as well as the budget. Both documents are then 
discussed in the council and the council committee meetings, where they are in general only 
slightly adapted on some details. According to interviewee e, a council clerk, her councillors 
have a real wait-and-see attitude to what the Executive offers them. 
 The precise contents and presentation of the text and figures in the p&c documents var-
ied among the municipalities researched. To all reports applied however, as indicated by the 
interviewees, that they did not contain much performance information. Whereas the programme 
budget, for example, gave a brief overview of the policy areas and initiatives, it hardly provided 
any specific and relevant performance data which could be helpful in fulfilling the steering and 
controlling tasks of the council. A financial civil servant, interviewee M, put it bluntly: “It is 
full of indicators, so-called steering information, but you can’t really do anything with it.” In 
case of a serious problem in a certain task field, or if new policy initiatives were taken, the civil 
servants – and sometimes the councillors themselves – had to collect more detailed and in-depth 
information on an incidental basis.  
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 Apart from some financial information per policy area, the p&c-documents included in 
several cases certain ‘performance’ data about processes and activities. “The discussions on 
policy issues during the budget meetings are mostly about the processes”, according to inter-
viewee K, a council clerk. Whereas the activities could be indicated in numbers – sometimes 
regarded as useful – the information about the processes and progress of policy implementation 
was often qualitative. However, overall the interviewees were of the opinion that, apart from 
the mandated indicators established in 2016/2017, the p&c-documents contained very little rel-
evant policy goals and output indicators, let alone outcome indicators. Councillor 12, for ex-
ample, notes that he saw the “most ridiculous indicators in the documents, which may look 
great, but really didn’t say anything”. The interviewees generally said that this is a consequence 
of the problems with finding a sensible way to measure performance. However, the vague pol-
icy goals also play a role here, since they make it more difficult to define clear and relevant 
performance indicators which could be included in the various planning & control (p&c) re-
ports.  
 Furthermore, several interviewees observed that both the programme budget and the 
Perspectives note were mainly focussed on a small number of specific policy areas and projects, 
in particular new policy initiatives. Councillor 3: “We primarily focus on new policy. I’m not 
going to dig into existing policy that easily either. I may only do that if certain signals have 
surfaced.” However, the interviewees also indicated that most of the budget was spent on the 
execution of annually recurring tasks. Not much information was given on these recurring tasks, 
neither in the budget itself nor in the annual account. Financial data and specifically perfor-
mance information on these tasks were only scarcely available in these documents, and if so, 
mainly in a highly aggregated form. 
 Additionally, in as far as the p&c documents paid attention to outputs and outcomes, 
this information was quite often qualitative, i.e. descriptive. If output or outcome indicators 
were included, this quantitative information was generally considered as partial and incomplete.  
Furthermore, the interviewees argued that one of the problems with this type of information 
was that it did not sufficiently depict the extent to which the municipality was responsible for 
the results. However, although several councillors indicated that they preferred clear and rele-
vant performance indicators and other accounting information, in many cases they also under-
lined that they were mainly interested in ‘policy’ and not in ‘numbers’. Councillor 18, for ex-
ample, said: “Sometimes I am interested in finances, when it comes to large amounts. But all 
those numbers… It’s not my job at all to look at that. The civil servants and auditors are in-
volved in numbers, and the province checks them. … I only have to look at the policy, I’m here 
for the citizens.”   
 The interviewees also explained, as noted before, that municipal policy notes typically 
do not include clearly defined goals or target values (which can be depicted by indicators). 
Particularly the civil servants, and some councillors, argued that this vagueness was sometimes 
intentional, for example because the Executives wanted to avoid having to account for targets 
that had not been met. Interviewee A, a financial civil servant: “The Executive usually doesn’t 
want to commit itself in advance ton SMART policy goals and related indicators. … And when 
the budget is discussed, the council neither says: ‘please be more precise about the goals to be 
realised’.” However, this lack of clear goals and targets further complicated the execution of 
the steering, monitoring and controlling activities on the basis of the available p&c-information.  
 The interviewees indicated that in comparison to the limited amount of performance 
information (or: useful performance information) the p&c documents, they did contain a lot of 
financial information. Furthermore, the budget and the Perspectives notes contained much con-
tent (in the form of text) about the more general policy ambitions and initiatives, the expected 
development of the finances of the municipality, as well as the new policy initiatives to be taken 
in the various specific policy areas (‘programmes’). Our own observation of the programme 
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budgets, perspectives notes and annual accounts/reports for 2015, 2016 and 2017 seems to con-
firm this. The documents – in particular the Perspectives note and the budget –  discuss new 
policy initiatives and changes in existing policies. The financial information in the documents 
typically included aggregated data on the income and expenses per group of products and tasks, 
and the contents of the programmes and policy fields. In addition, they provided a lot of man-
dated, rather technical financial information on the balance sheet (and, for example, on reserves 
and provisions, investments and depreciations, labour-cost related liabilities, interest rates and 
the EMU balance). The various intermediary reports produced by most municipalities were 
(almost) completely financial. 
 Most of this p&c-information was available to the councillors in a digital form so that 
they could access it on a tablet or a computer. In several cases they also could scroll down to 
the more detailed data. Some councillors liked the digital types of information, but this was 
certainly not the case for all of them, for example, because they found it more difficult to obtain 
an overview.  
 The councillors indicated that the more detailed technical overviews and tables were not 
considered as very interesting: “overviews of reserves, or incidental incomes and expenses, 
well, of course that is not really of political interest to me” (interviewee 20). So overall, as long 
as there were no financial issues, the financial information, no matter what kind, was not con-
sidered as very relevant. However, in case of fuss about an issue in a policy area, then council-
lors were suddenly interested in more detailed information about finances – i.e., at a less aggre-
gated level than available now. Councillor 1: “[in such a case] I say: ‘steering on main lines, I 
don’t think so, I want to know where the money goes’.”  
Apart from that, the councillors who were the financial specialists claimed that they 
were certainly interested in financial information about tasks and policy areas, although mostly 
not in all the technical details. Further, a few councillors explicitly indicated that they consid-
ered financial soundness and the absence of financial problems as basic criteria for a successful 
realisation of the municipal policies and political ambitions. They explained that financial prob-
lems could easily undermine the interests of the citizens and other stakeholders, because in case 
of, for example, budget deficits over a four-years period, a municipality could lose its financial 
autonomy. However, as already mentioned, apart from some financial specialists, the council-
lors said  that if there were no problems, they paid limited attention to the more detailed finan-
cial information . “These are all things containing numbers, they make me think: well, that’s 
fine, but this is for the auditor or for someone else”(councillor 21). 
 So, the findings show that many of the councillors (and civil servants and council clerks) 
were critical of the performance and other accounting information available in the p&c-docu-
ments. However, they also understood the complexity of measuring performance in the public 
sector. The councillors agreed that if the quality was good, more output- and outcome-related 
performance information could be useful. They were, however, far from clear about how they 
would like to see the information be improved. Many of them were of the opinion that, rather 
than including more information, the p&c-documents should be reduced because they were too 
extensive. Therefore, only a limited number of ‘key’ performance indicators should be added. 
Councillor 5 said: “The documents are often too thick. Sometimes I have the feeling that the 
civil servants are just typing more and more letters and numbers.”  
 In this context, financial civil servant H observed: “If you ask them, the councillors 
mainly want more compact information, the famous A4. Which is an illusion, if you want to 
provide the council with meaningful information.” So, in contrast to the councillors, the civil 
servants and council clerks were much more critical about reducing the size of the p&c-docu-
ments. They argued that both the quantity and quality of the current information provided to 
the councillors via the p&c-documents was insufficient for them to be able to conduct their 
steering, monitoring and controlling tasks properly. But at the same time, they also observed 
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the danger of an increase in information, since this might lead to an overload. And this would 
particularly be a problem, given the limited amount of hours in which most councillors had to 
do their work (although most of the councillors claimed that they did not really feel that they 
had too little time at their disposal). 
 
5.2 The information used by councillors   
 
In executing their monitoring and control activities for the Executive and the municipal organ-
isation, and representing their citizens, the councillors could make use of the accounting infor-
mation in the p&c-documents. The various interviews indicated that the councillors were 
mainly interested in the qualitative information, i.e. texts in these documents. These texts in-
formed them about the policy processes, and more specifically about developments and new 
initiatives. Given their political work domain, they considered this type of information the most 
relevant. For example, councillor 10, said: “I tend to focus on [text, …] the qualitative infor-
mation. Of course, sometimes it may be necessary to look at a detail or a number. .. [However,] 
measuring outputs and outcomes is very tough.  … [But even if it would be possible,] if there 
are many numbers, there is the temptation to only look at those numbers, instead of reading and 
discussing the substantive information about the policy.” 
 Of all the accounting information included in the p&c-documents, the councillors 
seemed to use the financial information to some extent. The performance indicators included in 
the documents were mostly not regarded as being very helpful. However, as noticed above, the 
‘ordinary’ council members left the financial details to the financial specialists in the council, 
the civil servants and the external auditor and trusted on their judgments. So they also largely 
ignored the financial information, unless there was a problem. 
 Councillor 19: “For the finances we have specialists, they check the figures. And there 
really is control of the finances, of course. The external auditor checks the annual account any-
way. … [Although I am more interested in policy developments] I am of the opinion that finan-
cially, we have to keep things in good shape. That’s important if we want to stay financially 
autonomous, or want to avoid to be more or less forced to merge with another municipality.” 
And civil servant E added: “Money is always a thing. In fact, most discussions in the council 
are about activities and money.” However, council clerk d had doubts about the extent to which 
councillors really used the financial and other information for their steering and control activi-
ties: “The council is in fact quite docile … The council members seldom present proposals for 
policy initiatives; they expect the Executive to do so. … The steering and controlling roles, 
well, this then means that the council reacts to [those proposals]. The council then asks ques-
tions, multiple questions, about the policy initiatives and the intended activities and to some 
extent also about the finances. … Those questions are often about details, about how the Exec-
utive is intending to avoid loose ends, so to say. For most councillors, it is very difficult to 
indicate which direction the policy should take. … This is also due to a lack of knowledge, I 
think.”   
 So it seems that in general the councillors did not make that much use of the regular 
financial information in the p&c-documents either, although they also indicated that healthy 
finances are crucial for municipalities’ autonomy, irrespective of whether there is financial 
stress or not.5 However, as was explained, since financial problems have a tendency to draw 
the attention from the media and/or from political parties in the ‘opposition’, councillors cannot 
ignore financial matters. Additionally, another reason for the councillors’ use of financial data 
                                                            
5 Municipalities in the Netherlands have a considerable autonomy in deciding about their policies, provided that 
the financial estimate for a period of four years ahead shows no deficit. If there is such a deficit, the Province, a 
hierarchically higher layer in Dutch government, or the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, will su-
pervise the municipality, possibly in return for financial support. 
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was that on the surface, this information seems to be relatively concrete and easy to understand, 
also if one is not an expert. Differences between budgeted amounts and the actual results are 
not difficult to observe and can easily be addressed and questioned in a council meeting. Inter-
viewee I, a financial civil servant stated somewhat cynical: “If the performance is difficult to 
measure and understand, then the financial numbers are seemingly easy to fall back on.”  
 However, as indicated before, the more technical financial information in the budget, 
consisting of the annual account and the various intermediate reports, was used very limitedly, 
according to the councillors, council clerks and civil servants. The same applied to the perfor-
mance information included in the documents.  
 Almost all councillors interviewed agreed that quantitative indicators on outputs and 
outcomes could in principle be useful if they represented relevant and measurable performance 
items and were also in other respects of good quality. Furthermore, most interviewees saw the 
available quantitative performance indicators as problematic, as indicated above. Apart from 
the low perceived value of the indicators, several councillors also underlined their preference 
to discuss ‘policies’ instead of ‘numbers’. Councillor 10, for example, said: “Measuring perfor-
mance is difficult, sure. But apart from that, when working with numbers, you may be tempted 
to focus too much on those numbers, instead of carefully reading the qualitative information 
about the contents of the policy.” Councillor 21 noted that “the discussion [in the council] is 
more about the content of the policy than about the figures”, which was confirmed by councillor 
2. Several councillors indicated that they doubted whether, with the exception of specific cases, 
it was actually possible to develop usable indicators that properly reflect the complexities of 
municipal outputs and outcomes. 
 The findings suggest that the limited use of the quantitative information in the p&c-
documents by the councillors is to some extent related to its low perceived quality and/or the 
limited relevance of the indicators available. This conclusion, in turn, suggests that technical 
improvements may be helpful in increasing the use of these documents. Limited time and 
knowledge on the part of the councillors, however, also seems to play a part. In addition, the 
councillors’ task perception may play a role, i.e. their generally limited interest in steering and 
controlling the Executives and their civil servants. Financial civil servant G observed that coun-
cillors generally only make an ad hoc use of the p&c-documents. “If you are talking about a 
systematic use of the performance information, that is not the case. In the case of the annual 
accounts, for example, the councillors mostly do not even take notice of whether or not a certain 
target included in the budget has been achieved. I don't think that they carefully read the docu-
ments prior to the meeting where the Executive gives account. When discussing the annual 
account and the annual report in the council, I often wonder if what councillors say is really 
based on what is in the documents, or whether they simply convey their own political story.” 
 The councillors generally claimed that they made some use of the information on pro-
cesses and activities in the p&c-documents, which was confirmed by civil servants and council 
clerks. However, as noted above, it was also indicated that the councillors made very little use 
of the (mostly limited) output and outcome information available in these documents. Council-
lor 20 observed: “I don’t read all the planning & control documents, only a few parts that could 
be interesting. … I read it strategically. Where does it become political? … [A]s a politician I 
want to achieve something new. So a Perspectives note, that can be interesting [since it enables 
us to decide about new policy initiatives], and to some extent also the budget, in which the new 
initiatives are elaborated further.” In a similar vein, councillor 18 said: “Well, I don’t read very 
much of all those documents. … Some parts of the budget: are they working on the initiatives 
we agreed upon in the coalition agreement? And for the rest, well, that’s when I usually pack it 
in. Forty or forty-five lampposts, that makes no odds to me.” However, many interviewees also 
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indicated that details are sometimes important. “A detail can also be a big thing. If it is politi-
cally sensible … In such a case a small intervention can become important”, according to in-
terviewee 19. 
 The councillors explained that they were more interested in the steering role of the coun-
cil than in controlling the Executive. However, they also acknowledged that in practice their 
steering role was not really that strong either. As they pointed out, the policy initiatives as well 
as the p&c-documents were generally almost completely drawn up by the civil servants and the 
Executive. As councillor 21 remarked: “Via the coalition agreement, which forms the basis for 
the policy initiatives to be developed by the Executive committee in a four years period, we can 
exert a certain influence, at least if our party is in the coalition. Since we are in the coalition 
now, I can sometimes also have some informal influence, for example via discussions with 
‘our’ alderman in the Executive committee. But for the rest, your possibilities to steer as a 
councillor are actually very limited in practice. The civil servants and the Executive present 
their plans to the council, and then the coalition parties mostly agree [with those plans]. … You 
can only get them changed if you succeed in convincing the majority of the council.” Councillor 
15, a councillor of a party not represented in the Executive added: “You could say that the 
planning & control documents are completely prepared by the Executive. The council has very 
little influence on their contents and that is even more the case if you are in the opposition.” 
Council clerk k confirmed that the Executive prepares the p&c-documents in detail, with some 
possibilities for coalition parties to influence their contents through informal meetings with 
members of the Executive. Civil servant E explicitly discussed the council’s limited role in the 
decision-making process, and the tension between informing the councillors on ‘main lines’ 
and providing them with information sufficiently detailed to really understand the backgrounds 
to the decisions to be taken. She said: “It is simply impossible to inform the council properly 
about all relevant issues, and that is a shame. It even erodes the political system a bit. … To 
what extent are the councillors really able to do politics adequately?” 
 Mostly, the notes and p&c-documents discussed in the council were at best changed on 
details, and only if necessary according to the council. “The longest discussions in the council 
are often about the smallest amounts”, councillor 4 said. And council clerk f said: “councillors 
do ask questions, sometimes also about performance, but steering the organisation … that’s 
another story.” Although they agreed that councillors work hard, a lack of time and knowledge 
on the part of the councillors played a role here, as explained by the civil servants and council 
clerks. In this context, several interviewees argued that for any councillor to have real influence 
on the policies and budgets, they had to take action already at a very early moment in the de-
velopment process, e.g. during the preparation of the coalition agreement and the discussions 
about the new policy note and/or Perspectives note. Still, it was generally mainly the input of 
the councillors affiliated to the political parties represented in the Executive that was seriously 
taken into account, as some of the interviewees explained. Councillor 14, for example, noted 
that it was easier for councillors of the coalition parties to have informal contacts with the al-
derman than for other council members. And this meant that the coalition councillors could 
sometimes get things done. “The dual system didn’t change that.” 
 So, in the opinion of most interviewees, the councillors’ steering role on the basis of the 
p&c-documents was limited. The councillors tend to focus mainly on those specific elements 
in the documents that they consider important. Furthermore, they were specifically interested 
in ‘incidents’ that drew the immediate attention, and about which they were possibly going to 
be contacted by citizens or other stakeholders (and which could bring them political gain). Fi-
nancial civil servant A: “When the shit hits the fan, yes, then the council is alert. And especially 
when there are financial issues. Money is politically sensitive.”  
 The interviewees all indicated that monitoring and controlling the Executive (and the 
municipal organisation) on main lines via interim reports and the annual account did not have 
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the council’s priority. New policy initiatives were regarded as more interesting. Councillor 1: 
“The council hardly discusses the annual account and the annual report, and neither controls 
the Executive on the basis of that. We pay very little attention to the accounts given by the 
Executive over the past year.” And council clerk j said about a meeting in which the annual 
account was on the agenda: “No word has been said about the annual account.” This also ap-
plied to the intermediate reports, which were generally also just hammer pieces. If they were 
addressed, it was often ‘for the sake of politeness’. Only if problems were reported, if citizens 
and organisations had contacted councillors, or if there was fuss in the local media, were the 
councillors occasionally be willing to ask questions about such reports. Nevertheless, some 
councillors felt that these documents did deserve more structural attention from the council, 
even though they themselves might not be particularly focussed on them. Councillor 11, for 
example, indicated: “Actually, I make too little use of the information in the annual account. I 
should  use it more intensively.” 
 The standard set of indicators that the municipalities had recently been mandated to 
include in their budgets, were by several councillors considered as a potentially interesting new 
tool. In principle, it gave them the opportunity to compare the scores of their municipality on a 
number of financial, economic and societal indicators with those of other municipalities. They 
could obtain these data on the countrywide website ‘waarstaatjegemeente’ (‘your municipal-
ity’s scores’). However, although there was not much experience yet with this standard set of  
indicators, other councillors and in particular civil servants were more critical. Several inter-
viewees recognised the possible informative quality of the indicators, but found their use in 
making comparisons among municipalities still difficult. Furthermore, the value of the indica-
tors was questioned because quite often the municipality itself had only little or no influence 
on the indicator scores, particularly not in the short term.  
 The interviewees generally agreed that the mandated indicators functioned at best to 
signal particular issues for further investigation. Councillor 6 said he did not have much need 
of these indicators: “You already have all kinds of information sources at your disposal: plat-
forms and dashboards. ... So I sometimes take a look at that, but if you have been in the council 
for a few years, then you know about the situation [and why it is like it is].” However, councillor 
15’s view as regards the possible contribution of the mandated indicators was perhaps a bit 
more nuanced: “It is sometimes easy for Executives to say that our municipality is incomparable 
with other municipalities. ... Key figures and policy indicators can then be useful in establishing 
a more reliable picture of how municipalities really relate to one another. For example, what 
does the solvency indicator of our municipality tell me? ... [On the other hand], with these 
indicators you run the risk that the discussion narrows, that the discussion concentrates too 
much on figure and what surrounds it, whereas there are often multiple factors that have an 
impact.” 
 So apart from the p&c-documents, the councillors had other sources of written infor-
mation available for the execution of their steering and controlling tasks. However, most coun-
cillors explicitly indicated that to them the more qualitative, verbal and informal types of infor-
mation were also very important. In fact, they often preferred information obtained during meet-
ings and via contacts with citizens, the representatives of companies, neighbourhood associa-
tions, sports clubs and special interest groups, or even via various (local) media. They argued 
that these types of information were highly important in enabling them to fulfil their role as 
elected representatives of the citizens properly. For example, interviewee 9, a very experienced 
councillor, said: “You have to talk to people and organisations; there you find truthful infor-
mation.” And councillor 5 added: “We seek consultation with external parties, … We make 
working visits to see how it works in practice, we invite a representative from an organisation. 
That is valuable. Then you obtain a real picture of the experiences and perceptions of the citi-
zens.”   
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  Additionally, as other important sources of verbal information the councillors men-
tioned the more informal contacts with the civil servants as well as informal meetings organised 
by the municipality. These meetings could be about particular issues, concerns of citizens, or 
the municipal tasks outsourced to an external organisation (for example to get an impression of 
the procedures followed by this organisation and the results obtained). Or it could be an infor-
mal explanatory meeting with some civil servants or other ‘technical’ specialists.  
 So, it became clear that the councillors’ interest in discussing the p&c-documents and 
steering, monitoring and controlling the execution of the policies by the Executives was gener-
ally quite limited. Councillor 11 had noticed that he had to be selective: “You cannot consider 
everything in such a document, that takes too much time. You can tackle only a limited number 
of topics.” The high level of trust of many of the councillors in the Executive and the civil 
servants, as indicated by several councillors (also from opposition parties), probably played a 
role here, but other factors as well, such as time restrictions. Furthermore, several councillors 
considered the financial control of the municipality specifically as a task of the external auditor. 
Interviewee 20 said: “We have the external auditor and the civil servants for that. Really, I do 
not consider that as my task. … I might [only] pay attention to this if it has developed into a 
‘political issue’. [More in general], as a representative of the citizens, I do not consider it my 
task to pay detailed attention to planning & control documents.” Other councillors regarded 
financial steering and control activities to be a task of the council’s audit committee, if there 
was such a committee, although council clerk k was critical about this view: “The members of 
the audit committee may tend to  think only in terms of figures; they don’t ask the questions 
that an ‘ordinary’ councillor would ask.”. 
 The fact that the external auditors and the audit committees were only focussed on fi-
nances and were not engaged in controlling the output and outcome performances, was not 
considered as problematic by the councillors. At least, it did not encourage them to pay in-
creased systematic attention to the control of planned outputs and outcomes themselves, as they 
indicated. Councillor 5 : “Look at the vision, the intentions. The money is less important, and I 
only look at it occasionally, which also applies to the performance indicators. … And if I do so, 
it is mainly when discussing new policy initiatives.” Council clerk d also confirmed that the 
councillors did not make much use of the figures available in the various documents. “They 
mainly look at what they can do with the policy proposals in the Perspectives note and the 
budget politically.” 
 In fact, many of the councillors seemed to indicate that for them particularly the quali-
tative information and the various more informal contacts were important, perhaps even the 
most important in their work. This finding may be explained by the councillors’ task perception. 
Formally, the task of a councillor is to steer, monitor and supervise the municipality on main 
lines, and to represent the citizens. However, many councillors indicated that they considered 
the latter (representing the citizens) as their prime (and best preferred) activity. 
 
5.3 The councillors’ task perception and alternative sources of information 
 
In the dual system, the councillors are supposed to steer, monitor and control the Executive 
(and its supporting civil servants) on main lines. Additionally, they act as the representatives of 
the citizens. Central government implicitly seems to consider all tasks as more or less equally 
important, although this notion has never been explicitly stipulated. However, the findings from 
the interviews suggest that in practice the ideas about the council’s  role and tasks may slightly 
differ from central government’s intentions.  
 First, the councillors had in general little interest in controlling the Executive on the 
basis of the p&c-documents, such as interim reports and the annual account, unless there was 
an ‘incident’. Instead, their focus was specifically on particular ‘details’ of interest, and on new 
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policy initiatives. So the councillors fulfilled their steering tasks to some extent, although in 
practice the Executive (and the civil servants) prepared most of the contents of the p&c-docu-
ments. However, these steering activities mainly related to new policy initiatives. Councillor 
14 remarked that in the documents and discussions, the existing policies hardly received any 
attention, whilst financial civil servant D added that the meetings about the Perspectives note 
and the budget were particularly focussed on “new policy and some details, pertaining all to-
gether to perhaps 1% of our total budget; the other 99% are simply tacitly accepted”. 
 Furthermore, finances and indicators in the p&c-documents were mainly discussed in 
case of problems or signals coming from citizens or from the media. It seems that many coun-
cillors separate ‘figures’ from ‘policy’. Councillor 10 said: “The budget must be sensible, but 
to me as a councillor political choices as regards policy are more important.” In this context, 
financial civil servant M argued that although the council approves the budget and the pro-
grammes included, in the present situation the council is in fact unable to steer the municipality 
in a proper manner. “They approve, and it may look as if they are steering the Executive. … 
But the information included in the programme budget is far too limited and too general [to 
obtain an adequate insight into new and existing policies]. … So due to the information’s lack 
of detail, the council often makes decisions on the basis of insufficient knowledge. In my opin-
ion, the council is not sufficiently equipped to adequately exercise its right to approve the 
budget now.” 
 The interviews also made clear that the councillors’task perception and the preferences 
for certain types of information varied considerably. Several councillors, council clerks and 
civil servants pointed towards individual differences among the councillors in their use of the 
p&c-documents and other sources. An important factor in this context was, for example, the 
limited amount of time available to execute the council work. Councillor 19 said: “As a coun-
cillor you are always busy. So you are only going to do the nice, the politically interesting 
things. You also mainly look at plans instead of monitoring the existing policies, even though 
that may not be a justifiable approach.” Furthermore, the extent of the councillors’ work expe-
rience (professional experience, or numbers of years in the council) significantly determined 
their ability to estimate which information was relevant and which was not. Other factors men-
tioned that possibly played a role in the councillors’ information use were the degree of educa-
tion, the attendance in specific courses/trainings for council members, the comprehensibility of 
the documents to non-specialists, the avoidance of information overload, differences in person-
ality (e.g., the inclination to focus on either ‘numbers’ or ‘words’) and differences in individual 
interests. This variety of factors, each of which influenced the councillors' information use and 
their preferences differently, made it difficult to adjust the performance and other accounting 
information in the p&c-documents in a manner satisfactory to all councillors, as several inter-
viewees indicated. And as already noted above, there was also a tension among the desire of 
councillors to reduce the size of the documents, to focus on ‘key figures’, and their desire for 
detailed information about outputs and outcomes in specific situations. Some councillors ex-
plicitly said that technical improvements of the p&c-information were costly and that they 
would probably consider them as a waste of money.  
 However, as discussed above, whether or not the information was sufficient, the coun-
cillors were not primarily interested in the performance and other accounting data in the p&c-
documents. Instead, in order to remain properly informed and to give voice to the interests of 
the stakeholders, contact with citizens was specifically important to them. And although the 
p&c-documents might sometimes be helpful in this context, our interviews made clear that most 
of the councillors considered them of limited relevance to their work. Interviewee 9: “We are 
the representatives of the citizens, not bookkeepers.” And councillor 21 added explicitly that 
she preferred to spend her time on other things than on the p&c-documents. “I go into the streets 
and talk to people, I visit institutions and associations.”  
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 So in sum, several councillors clearly preferred information obtained during discussions 
and meetings with citizens and other stakeholders, i.e. verbal and qualitative (and probably 
often more subjective) information. They found that this type of information and the oppor-
tunity to ask questions ‘on the spot’ provided them with insights that no other knowledge 
sources were able to give them, namely a deeper understanding of the contents and functioning 
of certain policies or of an organisation’s actual tasks and how it functioned and/or was organ-
ised. In this way, the councillors were also given a much clearer impression of ‘technical com-
plexities’ and how the policies were experienced and appreciated by those involved. In addition, 
they could use this information during council meetings to ask questions, or perhaps even sug-
gest concrete proposals for policy changes. Mainly for these reasons, the councillors perceived 
this information as very important.  
 Also the other interviewees, in particular several of the civil servants, indicated that over 
the years the councillors seemed to have developed an increased interest in more qualitative, 
preferably verbal information provided by more informal information sources. Therefore, some 
municipalities had started to regularly organise more informal meetings with particular individ-
uals, interest groups, organisations, or the civil servants. Council clerk j: “This kind of infor-
mation can simply not be obtained via paper sources. A physical information evening is much 
more productive in such cases.” Council clerk k agreed that information meetings for the coun-
cil can be very helpful and are appreciated by the councillors. Council clerk h explained that in 
her opinion it is often very difficult to render a clear account of the results that the municipality 
wants to realise with a certain policy. “We then organise, for example, a theme evening or a 
working visit to provide background information about this policy component in the budget.” 
It seemed that these types of meetings provided the councillors with valuable knowledge of the 
policies and the organisations’ activities and experiences. And this knowledge helped them in 
increasing their understanding of factors such as the policy’s or organisation’s intentions, their 
functioning, and controversial issues.  
 The councillors indicated three situations in which they would generally address the 
information in the p&c-documents: if they had been contacted by citizens or organisations about 
a certain issue, if a problem had drawn the attention of the media, and/or if they saw an oppor-
tunity for obtaining political gain. It was also explained that particular financial information or 
output and outcome indicators sometimes formed the basis for the political debates organised 
by members from opposition parties. However, neither in these cases were the  documents con-
sulted extensively. Council clerk f, for example, observed that “if a theme is sensitive, council-
lors will ask for more information, but even then they often seem to be unable or unwilling to 
take a decision. … [When the information is received,] there is no response. Asking for more 
information is the easiest thing in the world. And it actually gives you the feeling that you are 
doing something.” 
 If incidents concerning finances or particular policies were really pressing, the council 
– and in particular the parties in the opposition – would ask various internal and external sources 
for more detailed quantitative and/or qualitative information on the specific subject. This vari-
ety of information then served as a sound basis for a thorough discussion. The civil servants 
had to collect this information and distribute it among the council members. They indicated that 
councillors cannot expect to find such specific and detailed information in the regular p&c-
documents.  
 However, as several interviewees noted, even if there were clear indications that the 
Executive and/or the municipal organisation did not function properly, the coalition parties of-
ten tried to ‘protect’ the Executive. As councillor 15 put it: “There is … a big difference between 
the opposition and the coalition parties in the council. The coalition parties are bound to each 
other and to the Executive via the coalition agreement. … The coalition parties usually do not 
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want to let the Executive down in public.” Councillor 4 made a similar statement: “The alder-
man exerts his influence, while the chairmen of the coalition parties also consult with each other 
beforehand. This is how the council meeting is actually being prepared, while the rows of the 
coalition are often closed during the meeting.” This means that in actual practice there are often 
strong ties between a part of the council and the Executive, although this is not in line with the 
principal – agent view, as postulated by central government with the introduction of the dual 
system.  
 In some of the interviews, the role of the council as the principal in the municipal or-
ganisation was also discussed. Council clerk j, for example, said: “The council is gradually 
becoming less dual. The attitude is now more directed towards ‘we do it together for the citi-
zens’. In my opinion we are moving away from dualism.” She suggested that instead of making 
sharp distinctions between the role of the Executive and that of the council, there is a stronger 
tendency towards cooperation between the council and the opposition, and between the coali-
tion parties and the Executive. In several cases, interviewees – including councillors from op-
position parties – mentioned that there was a rather high level of trust between the council and 
the Executive. Councillor 6 expressed himself as follows: “Everything that goes on around here 
is tinged with ‘political intent’, but the basis for my counsel work is that I trust the civil servants 
and the Executive, and their expertise and experience.”  
These observations may cast some doubt upon whether the elementary ideas with re-
spect to the principal-agent relationship between the council and the Executive, as represented 
by NPM and the dual system, actually fit in with the day-to-day practice in the municipalities 
included in the research. Further, as indicated above, the councillors differ from central gov-
ernment’s intentions by focusing on their role as a representative of the citizens and their pref-
erence for qualitative and verbal types of information. 
  
 6. Discussion and conclusion  
 
This section will first present the conclusions of the research, followed by a discussion of some 
of the findings and conclusions. As is mostly the case with descriptive and explorative types of 
field research, the municipalities and interviewees included in the research are not necessarily 
representative of the whole population. So the findings and conclusions cannot be generalised 
to all municipalities in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Taking the empirical findings in the cases 
researched into consideration, the following conclusions can be drawn with respect to the broad 
research questions presented in section 3 of this paper.  
 The councillors interviewed generally made only limited use of the performance and 
other accounting information available to them in the various municipal planning & control 
documents (research question 1). The interviewees found the more future-oriented information 
in the Perspectives note and the programme budget to some extent interesting, but in particular 
the annual account received very little attention. In fact, many of them were not interested in 
this type of regular, ‘standardised’ accounting information at all. They (as well as the civil 
servants) argued that although in cases of specific problems or when ‘political gain’ could be 
obtained, they might at times require extensive detailed information, the regular planning & 
control documents did generally not include this type of  information. In particular financial 
information, containing e.g. details of budget overruns, could be important in these situations. 
The desire to achieve political gain, especially when the media was drawing the attention to a 
specific problem, could particularly be important to councillors from the opposition parties, as 
several interviewees indicated (and as is also suggested by Vliegenthart et al., 2016, p. 295). 
 Furthermore, the councillors argued that whereas some improvements could be made to 
the performance information, they were generally satisfied with it (see also research question 
1). The civil servants and council clerks, however, were of the opinion that the councillors 
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needed more and better accounting information. However, some of the councillors explicitly 
doubted whether it would make sense to try to improve the information, having in mind the 
presumably high costs of such improvements (probably to be realised with the help of, for ex-
ample, external consultancy firms). So all in all, the councillors did not seem to feel an urgent 
need to change the documents, also because they were not used very intensively. It seems that 
in some cases their doubts as regards the readjustment of the accounting information were also 
related to the benchmark information available on nationwide websites since some years. Alt-
hough several councillors and civil servants were critical of the information on these websites 
and their use because it did not really inform them about their municipal’s contribution to the 
‘performance’ reported, others considered it as helpful to obtain an impression of the relative 
position of their municipality. The research, however, did not provide clarity on the extent to 
which these more positive views were expressed by councillors who were ‘newcomers’, as was 
suggested later on by some interviewees.  
 Some councillors indicated that they actually preferred more detailed financial infor-
mation in the planning & control documents. The financial information available now – as well 
as performance information, insofar as this is included – usually concerns new (or sensitive) 
policy initiatives, whilst the information on ‘regular’ policies – which take the bulk of the 
budget – is commonly presented at a high level of aggregation and is not regarded as very 
informative. Although perhaps not very ‘NPM-like’, the councillors were in several cases more 
interested in financial information, i.e. information on inputs, than in performance indicators, 
which are often considered as rather vague or irrelevant. However, as suggested by some civil 
servants (and also by some councillors), this ‘interest’ of councillors in financial data might be 
explained by their notion that financial figures are relatively easy to understand and ask ques-
tions about.  
 With respect to the second research question, the accounting information required by 
the councillors to fulfil their role as a principal and the related decision-making and controlling 
tasks, the research suggests two findings. First, the councillors considered the information avail-
able to them in the planning & control documents overall as sufficient. In fact, many councillors 
preferred the size of the documents and the amount of information to be reduced, for example, 
to only information on the most important policy aspects and ‘key performances’.  The second, 
perhaps more important finding is that in practice the council does not fulfil the role that it has 
formally been given, namely that of principal in the municipal organisation, as indicated by 
both the councillors themselves and other interviewees. The councillors had relatively little 
interest in their task of steering and controlling the Executive (and the municipal organisation) 
and prefer to focus on their role as a representative of the citizens. They seem to consider the 
activities of representing the citizens and steering - and in particular monitoring and controlling 
the Executive on a regular basis – as two unrelated tasks.  
 The dual system, introduced by central government in the Netherlands, promotes (and 
presumes) a clear separation of roles between on the one hand the aldermen, i.e. the Executive 
(and the civil servants who support them) and on the other hand the municipal council, with its 
elected politicians. According to central government and in line with the view promoted by 
NPM and its underlying principal-agent theory, the council should, as a principal, steer and 
control the Executive and the municipal organisation and its policies on main lines. The Exec-
utive and the civil servants have to execute these policies. However, in practice it is the Exec-
utive and the civil servants who to a very large extent, if not almost completely, develop the 
policy notes and prepare the various planning & control documents, with only some very minor 
changes made in these documents by the council. This limited involvement of the council is 
probably also a consequence of the lack of time, knowledge and experience of the councillors 
to develop proposals which could be included in these documents, as several interviewees, in 
particular civil servants and council clerks, remarked. The attention for accounting instruments 
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and documents, which came alongside with the PMI project, certainly helped to strengthen the 
financial management of municipalities and the timely production of their accounting docu-
ments (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2005). However, although the term ‘results’ became more 
important in discussions, it is unclear whether the planning & control documents available now 
provide the councillors with better performance information that contributes to strengthening 
their position in the political decision-making process (as was intended by the PMI project and 
the dual system). 
 Furthermore, the interviewees pointed out that – although the dual system presumes and 
prescribes a clear distinction between principal and agent –  the council does not really operate 
as a more or less homogeneous and univocal principal. Many interviewees made clear that in 
practice there is a close cooperation between the Executive and the coalition parties in the coun-
cil, i.e. the parties represented in the Executive. In specific cases, the council can of course act 
as the principal, but more often the Executive and the coalition parties in the council informally 
prepare decisions and policies together. This nuance with respect to the activities of the council 
further blurs its role as the principal in the municipal organisation. 
 Concerning the third research question, probably the most important finding is the pri-
mary focus of the councillors on their task of representative of the citizens. Many councillors 
particularly emphasised this approach. And in this context, they mentioned their preference for 
more qualitative, verbal information, for example in the form of meetings with citizens and 
other stakeholders, or informal discussions with civil servants. Although some councillors had 
also some desires with respect to the accounting information they received, such requirements 
were more varying and less explicit. The councillors considered the meetings, in particular 
those with external stakeholders, as very important for obtaining an impression of how ‘policy 
works in practice’ and how it is experienced by the citizens and others involved. Councillors 
seem to consider obtaining more insight into the views and perceptions of the external stake-
holders as well as giving voice to the interests of the citizens, as the most important parts of 
their work and their most preferred task. During the interviews, several civil servants and coun-
cil clerks also indicated that particularly in recent years the councillors have become increas-
ingly interested in information and discussion meetings. Several municipalities in fact organise 
these meetings more regularly now.  
 So the findings seem to indicate that the councillors interviewed are not primarily inter-
ested in the civil servants changing the accounting information they provide, but rather in re-
ceiving other types of information. Recent studies of some other authors in the Netherlands 
have also suggested the rise of the trend of councillors being more interested in qualitative 
information collected in meetings with citizens and others (Pommer and Boelhouwer, 2017, 
p.31; cf. van Stipdonk and van den Berg, 2018, pp.91-93). Such a trend may indicate an in-
creased interest of elected politicians in the ideas and opinions of external partners, which 
should be included in the democratic decision making process. Alternatively, it could also be 
considered, for example, as an indication of the ‘fear’ of politicians to decide without having 
the stakeholders consulted explicitly (see also Van Reybrouck, 2013). Whatever the back-
ground is, more or less similar developments could probably be observed in several other coun-
tries recently (cf. de Gruyter, 2019, pp. 24-25), for example the ‘citizens’ assemblies’ in Ireland 
(concerning the abortion debate), Scotland (concerning the type of country it wants to be and 
the challenges face, including Brexit), or France (concerning the reduction of CO2 emissions). 
Of course, such developments do not make accounting information on government organisa-
tions irrelevant. However, if such tendencies continue to play a role and if their importance 
increases, they may necessitate an increased attention for other forms of information provision, 




All this may indicate that apart from having some interest in information on finances, the coun-
cillors included in the research are developing a preference for types of information other than 
the written, standardised accounting information in the planning & control documents (which 
in many cases are also available in digital form). Perhaps it could even be tentatively concluded 
that the councillors’ knowledge of the outputs and outcomes of the municipal policies seems to 
be obtained to an increasing extent by the verbal and possibly subjective information and im-
pressions collected during the more informal meetings, and to a lesser degree by the written 
accounting information in documents.  
 At the moment, we can only speculate about why this is the case. Scepticism about the 
idea that public sector performance can be adequately expressed in numbers and disappointment 
in the value of quantitative performance indicators could play a role. However, from a critical 
point of view, it may also be argued that in the present situation, the ‘democratic role’ of the 
council is mainly limited to those exceptional cases where there are real problems, since many 
councillors seem to lack the time, knowledge and experience to always do their work properly. 
In fact, several civil servants and council clerks seemed to be inclined to take such a position 
(although they only incidentally explicitly touched the position of the councillor in the demo-
cratic process). Moreover, they were of the opinion that most councillors are working hard. 
Nevertheless, it seems that it can be concluded that, only in case of serious problems and/or 
fuzz in the media did the councillors make use of the (detailed) performance and other account-
ing information to steer and control the Executive and the municipal organisation.  
 Whether the councillors’ focus on being a representative as well as a voice of the citizens 
is also related to the rise of populism over the last twenty years or so, could be an issue for 
future research. In this context, Spruyt et al. (2016, p. 344) state that it is clear that “politicians 
and parties who aim to decrease the demand for populism should primarily invest in reducing 
the (rather widespread) feeling that they are unresponsive to the concerns and grievances of 
voters.” In a similar way, Acemoglu et al. (2013, p. 773) observe that populism can be a moti-
vation for politicians to make clear to the voters “that they are not in the pockets of the elite” 
(see also Reid et al., 2019, pp. 16-19). In this respect, the definition of the term elite may need 
to be explored further. Is it, for example, mainly defined in terms of economic prosperity, or is 
it a much broader and not very clearly defined concept? And how does it influence the ‘political 
behaviour’ and information use of politicians (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 293)? 
 The preference that the councillors seem to have for qualitative information collected 
via meetings and discussions, may also be explained by another development. The interest of 
Dutch municipalities in performance indicators in the 1990s and the early 2000s was initially 
related to the so-called PMI project – an NPM-like initiative – which introduced output budgets 
(van Helden, 1998). After the traditional, Weberian focus of the public sector on inputs and 
processes, NPM aspired a shift towards outputs and outcomes. Although in practice, this shift 
may not have led to a one-sided focus of the public sector (and its politicians) on outputs and 
outcomes, it is clear that these outputs and outcomes started receiving more attention in addition 
to the inputs and processes. So, developments in public policy over time played a role here. As 
indicated by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p. 211), such a development can be regarded as a 
process of sedimentation (“new layers overlie but do not replace or completely wash away the 
previous layer”; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 8), rather than as a complete paradigm shift. 
This illustrates that older structures and procedures also continue to be relevant. The same could 
be said about New Public Governance (NPG), as sketched by Osborne (2006), with its increased 
emphasis on consultation with citizens and other stakeholders, networks and partnerships, and 
their participation in government decisions.  
 Although the possible effects of NPG on the internal structures of government or, for 
example, on the planning & control documents do not seem to be very clear, it is obvious that 
currently NPG certainly draws the attention to external parties of government (see also Pollitt 
24 
 
and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 106). And as it is probably not so easy to include information about 
external relations or parties (and their performance) in the municipal planning & control docu-
ments, this could be a reason why councillors attach so much value to the (informal meetings) 
where they can collect verbal and more qualitative information. This preference may also be 
explained by yet another new ‘layer’ distinguished by some authors, i.e. the so-called ‘respon-
sive government’ (ROB, 2012; Van der Steen et al., 2015). The idea of the responsive govern-
ment – perhaps ‘just’ a further step in the development of NPM and NPG – can be regarded as 
a trend that has developed relatively recently in the Netherlands (and which was probably stim-
ulated by the financial cutbacks after the Financial and Economic crisis). Apart from trying to 
involve citizens and other external stakeholders and networks in the government decision-mak-
ing process, the responsive government aims to recognize valuable initiatives in society, ‘listen’ 
to what the parties involved in such initiatives want, and see how their wishes can be integrated 
into the realisation of the goals and ambitions of government (ROB, 2012; Van der Steen et al., 
2015, p. 27). As was discussed before, in several other countries similar types of initiatives 
seem to develop which make groups of citizens more directly involved in the democratic deci-
sion-making process (de Gruyter, 2019). 
 The precise definitions and meanings of the more recently developed ‘layers’ and how 
they work in practice need to be researched further. But most important is that NPG as well as 
the ‘responsive government’ and similar developments elsewhere draw the attention more ex-
plicitly to the external stakeholders than ‘traditional’ NPM used to do. However, providing 
councillors with sufficient information about external parties and networks (cf. ter Bogt, 2018) 
- or external initiatives and stakeholders - may be problematic, which also particularly applies 
to information about the ‘feelings and experiences’ of the people involved. It is therefore ques-
tionable whether this type of information can be included in the regular planning & control 
documents. And this could logically explain the preference of councillors, who are directly 
being confronted with societal issues (including the rise of populism), for collecting information 
via meetings and discussions. But it is unclear to what extent this will mean that that this type 
of information will replace the existing performance and other accounting information in plan-
ning & control documents. As indicated above and suggested by Pollit and Bouckaert (2011, 
p.211), in the somewhat longer term new types of information (i.e., verbal and qualitative) may 
be added to the existing types of information as extra layers of information.  
 To conclude, the findings from the field research cast serious doubt on the viability of 
the roles that NPM and the Dutch dual system allocate to the principal and agent in the munic-
ipal organisation. In addition, it questions the effectiveness of the idea of controlling such an 
organisation mainly on the basis of ‘rational’ information presented in written accounting doc-
uments. Future research could further explore the developments in the position and information 
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